Therefore, it is crucial for sanctions to be effective and efficient. In order to secure their effectiveness, it is necessary to know how they work, whether they reach their goals; who and how avoid restrictions; with what sanctions Russia \u00ablearnt to live without pain\u00bb; and what corrections are needed to strengthen them.<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n USA and the European Union declared their intent to introduce sanctions against Russia for its actions in Crimea before the so-called \u00abreferendum\u00bb. They realized their intent next day after \u00abreferendum\u00bb \u2013 on March 17, 2014. The first Western sanctions have been against individuals \u2013 they targeted public officials whose actions undermined the territorial integrity of Ukraine.<\/p>\n However, \u00abCrimean sanctions\u00bb are not only against natural persons as Russian politicians and mass media often emphasize, in order to diminish their importance. Sanctions also target a number of economic sectors. EU and USA sanctions ban their citizens to invest into the Crimean economy, to buy businesses in Crimea or to provide services and goods to Crimean companies since 2014. The total ban has been imposed on banking, energy, transport and construction sectors as well as on oil and gas exploration, exploration of other natural resources and related infrastructure, export of new technologies to these sectors and import of goods from Crimea.<\/p>\n Assets of those in sanction lists have been frozen whereas it has been banned for EU and USA citizens and companies to conduct any transactions with them. Those who violate this ban are under the risk to be sanctioned, too.<\/p>\n Crimean sanctions will be active until de-occupation of Crimea as they are an integral part of the EU and USA policy to oppose<\/strong> an attempt of the annexation of Crimea and Sebastopol by Russia. The Center of Journalist Investigations will uncover the effect of sanctions on various sectors of the Crimean economy in six reports within two months. This material focuses on the most widespread schemes to avoid sanctions by businesses in various economic sectors investigated by our journalists.<\/p>\n Military Industrial Complex. Top secret.<\/p>\n Military Industrial Complex. Top secret<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Russia realized the true goal of the annexation and turned the peninsula into the giant military base within first years of the occupation of Crimea and Sebastopol. It drastically changed the balance of power in the region. Even block-conductors of \u00abChornomornaftogaz\u00bb on occupied Ukrainian deposits on Black Sea shelf now serve military purposes \u2013 radiolocation equipment to monitor air and under water space has been installed on them.<\/p>\n At first, Russian authorities cautiously introduced \u00absupervisors\u00bb on occupied Ukrainian enterprises of the military industrial complex. After those enterprises have been included into EU and USA sanction lists, they have been integrated with the Russian military industrial complex and consequently included into the Defense Acquisition Order (DAO). Tetyana Guchakova<\/strong>, the expert of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, believes that the main scheme to avoid sanctions in military industrial complex is not within the responsibility of any given enterprise:<\/p>\n \u00abIt is the governmental policy of the Russian Federation. It can be described by one word \u2013 the secret. The regime of secrecy has been gradually built up. Access to the register of enterprises of the military industrial complex has been closed in September 2015. Some Crimean enterprises have been included into the register. The so-called \u00abblack box\u00bb of the DAO has been introduced in February 2017. In other words, any defense purchases are conducted behind the closed doors\u00bb.<\/p>\n Tetyana Guchakova, the expert of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, Photo: investigator.org.ua<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n The next protective wall against Western sanctions has been built when the government of the Russian Federation closed an access to data in the Unified Business Register (EGRUL) about legal persons already in sanction lists, located in Crimea or about those legal persons, which could be included into EU and USA sanction lists.<\/p>\n Crimean companies, including private ones, the recipients of the Russian defense orders, try to hide themselves by registering companies on the territory of the Russian Federation or by creating new companies-twins.<\/p>\n As an example, let us look into the company URANIS<\/strong> founded by Igor Kaluzhny and his sons Leonid and Volodymyr in 2006 in Sebastopol on the basis of the factory MUSSON. The enterprise is known in the world as the developer and manufacturer of cheap and reliable radio communication equipment (short and ultra short waves) and sea radio electronic devices (antennas, amplifiers and emergency satellite radio beacons).<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/investigator.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/Screenshot_251.png\")
<\/a>